

MFG Models in Economics

Examples from capital dynamic theory

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Example 1.

Krusell-Smith (and others...) framework (1/11)
"K&S" (PLL, JML)

• Individual agents characteristics

θ_i : productivity parameter of agent i

k_i : capital owned by agent i

• Production of agent i

$$Y_i = \theta_i \sqrt{k_i + \tilde{k}_i}$$

$$(Y_i = F(\theta_i, k_i, \tilde{k}_i))$$

where \tilde{k}_i is capital rented by agent i (controlled by i)

• State space: $\underline{\theta} \leq \theta_i \leq \bar{\theta}$, $k_i > 0$

$$\Omega = [\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}] \times \mathbb{R}_+$$

K α S framework (2/11)

Individual productivities are random

$$d\theta_i = \sigma dW_i + \varepsilon dB$$

where W_i, B are independent Brownians

dW_i individual risk of agent i

dB common risk shared by all agents

Capital is both needed

- to produce

- to insure against risks

(In complete market models)

K&S framework (3/11)

- Market for capital
 - price p_t at time t
 - prices are endogenous, fixed by equilibrium
- Cost to maintain capital δk_i (δ constant)

Hence Dynamic of agent i capital is:

$$\dot{k}_i = \theta_i \sqrt{k_{i,t} + \tilde{k}_i} - p_t \tilde{k}_i - \delta k_i - c_i$$

At each time t , agent i will optimize the choice of \tilde{k}_i borrowed, c_i consumption

K α S framework (4/11)

Agent i optimization problem

$$\text{Max } \mathbb{E} \int_0^{+\infty} e^{-\pi t} U(C_i(t)) dt \quad (U = \text{utility function})$$

under constraints:

$$\tilde{k}_i \leq \lambda k_i \quad (\lambda = \text{leverage parameter})$$

$$k_i \geq 0$$

$$d\theta_i = \sigma_0 dW_i + \varepsilon dB$$

$$\dot{k}_i = \theta_i \sqrt{k_i + \tilde{k}_i} - r_e \tilde{k}_i - \delta k_i - C_i(t)$$

K & S framework (5/11)

Given prices (p_t)

agent i faces a (dynam) stochastic optimization problem

Closed loop solution

$$c_i^* = f_i(t, \theta_i, k_i)$$

$$\tilde{k}_i^* = g_i(t, \theta_i, k_i)$$

As all agents are identical, agents in the same state (θ, k) at the same time t , will take the same optimal choice.

$c^* = f(t, \theta, k)$ optimal consumption of an agent in state (θ, k)

$k^* = g(t, \theta, k)$ optimal amount of capital borrowed by an agent

Denote $\varphi(t, \theta, k) = \theta \sqrt{k + \tilde{k}^*} - p_t \tilde{k}^* - \delta k - c^*$

the dynamic of individual capital induced by optimal closed loop choices

(K&S) framework (6/11)

Population dynamic

$m(t, \theta, k)$ density of agents, at time t , in state (θ, k)

$$dm = \left[\frac{\partial}{\partial k} (\varphi(t, \theta, k) m(t, \theta, k)) + \frac{1}{2} (\sigma^2 + \varepsilon^2) \frac{\partial^2 m}{\partial \theta^2} \right] dt + \frac{\partial m}{\partial \theta} \varepsilon dB$$

- optimal individual choices + independent risks \rightarrow deterministic dynamic (drift)
- shared risk $dB \rightarrow$ stochastic population move

KLS framework (7/11)

Optimal individual choices $\varphi \rightarrow$ (random) population dynamic

population state $m_t \rightarrow$ price P_t

(random) price dynamic \rightarrow optimal individual choices φ

K < S framework (8/11)

Optimal choice of agent : HFG equation on value function

Stationary case on population dynamic

Value function $\mathcal{U}(\theta, k, m)$ defined by

$$\mathcal{U}(\theta_0, k_0, m_0) = \text{Max} \mathbb{E} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} u(c_t) dt \quad ; \quad \theta(0) = \theta_0, k(0) = k_0, m(0) = m_0$$

s.t. dynamics equations

Formal derivation of the HFG equation :

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{U}(\theta_0, k_0, m_0) &= \text{Max} \mathbb{E} \left[u(c) dt + e^{-\rho dt} \mathcal{U}(\theta_0 + d\theta_0, k_0 + dk_0, m_0 + dm_0) \right] \\ &= \text{Max}_{c, \tilde{k}} \mathbb{E} \left[u(c) dt + (1 - \rho dt) \left(\mathcal{U}(\theta_0, k_0, m_0) + \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}}{\partial \theta} d\theta_0 + \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}}{\partial k} dk_0 + \dots \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$0 = -\rho \mathcal{U} + \text{Max}_{c, \tilde{k}} \mathbb{E} \left[u(c) + \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}}{\partial \theta} d\theta + \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}}{\partial k} dk + \dots \right]$$

KaS framework (9/11)

ITFG equation on value U .

$$0 = -\pi U_b + \max_{c, \tilde{k}, s.t.} \mathbb{E} \left[u(c) + \frac{\partial U_b}{\partial \theta} (\sigma dW + \varepsilon dB) + \frac{\partial U}{\partial k} (\theta \sqrt{k + \tilde{k}} - \delta k - p \tilde{k} - c) \right. \\ \left. + \frac{\partial^2 U_b}{\partial \theta^2} \frac{\sigma^2 + \varepsilon^2}{2} + \nabla_m U \cdot dm + \frac{1}{2} \langle \underline{\partial^2 U} \cdot dm, dm \rangle \right]$$

$$0 = -\pi U_b + \max_{c, \tilde{k}, s.t.} \left[u(c) + \frac{\partial U_b}{\partial k} (\theta \sqrt{k + \tilde{k}} - \delta k - p \tilde{k} - c) + \frac{1}{2} (\sigma^2 + \varepsilon^2) \frac{\partial^2 U_b}{\partial \theta^2} + \frac{1}{2} \langle \underline{\partial^2 U} \cdot dm, dm \rangle \right]$$

$$\max_c \left[u(c) - \frac{\partial U_b}{\partial k} c \right] \Rightarrow u'(c^*) = \frac{\partial U_b}{\partial k}$$

$$c^* = (u')^{-1} \left(\frac{\partial U_b}{\partial k} \right)$$

$$\max_{\tilde{k} \leq \lambda k} \left[\frac{\partial U}{\partial k} (\theta \sqrt{k + \tilde{k}} - p \tilde{k}) \right] \Rightarrow \tilde{k}^* = \max \left\{ \lambda k, \frac{\theta^2}{4p^2} - k \right\}$$

K&S framework (10/11)

population state $m_t \rightarrow$ price P_t

Equilibrium on capital borrowing market

$$\int \max \left\{ \lambda k, \frac{\theta^2}{4p^2} - k \right\} m_t(\theta, k) dk = 0 \quad (\Rightarrow P = \psi(\theta, m))$$

For ex., if $d = +\infty$ (no "friction" on capital borrowing market)

$$\int \left(\frac{\theta^2}{4p^2} - k \right) m(\theta, k) dk = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\theta^2}{4p^2} = \int k m(\theta, k) dk$$

$P = \frac{\theta}{2} \frac{1}{\sqrt{m_2}} \Rightarrow$ P depends only on first moment of the density m

K-S framework (11/11)

Back to RFG equation on value ψ

$$0 = -\tau \psi + u(c^*) + \frac{\partial \psi}{\partial k} (\theta \sqrt{k + \tilde{k}^*} - \delta k - p \tilde{k}^*) + \frac{1}{2} (\sigma^2 + \epsilon^2) \frac{\partial^2 \psi}{\partial \theta^2} + \frac{1}{2} (\partial^2 \psi / \partial u^2, du, du)$$


$$\tilde{k}^* = \max \left\{ \lambda k, \frac{\theta^2}{4p^2} - k \right\}$$

$$c^* = u'^{-1} \left(\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial k} \right)$$

$$p = \psi(\theta, m) \quad \left(\text{for ex. } p = \frac{\theta}{2\sqrt{m}} \right), \text{ given by } \int \tilde{k}^* m(\theta, k) dk = 0$$

Solve by small noise expansion on $\epsilon \dots$ (work in progress)

Example 2 . Time to build models (1/4)
(OG, JNL, PLL)



1 = building stage
2 = production state

α, β , transition probabilities
 c entrance flow

c = given exogenous

α = controlled ; i.e. : each agent controls his own α_i

δ = controlled ; i.e. : each agent controls his own δ_i

costs : $\frac{1}{2} \alpha_i^2$, $\frac{1}{2} \delta_i^2$

Time to build (2/4)

agents in box 1 optimization problem:

$$\max_{\alpha} \left[\kappa (u_2 - u_1) - \frac{\alpha^2}{2} \right]$$

agents in box 2 optimization problem

$$\max_{\delta} \left[-\delta u_2 - \frac{1}{2\delta^2} \right]$$

Optimal choice of agents given (m_1, m_2) and (u_1, u_2)

$$\alpha^* = u_2 - u_1$$

$$\delta^* = (u_2)^{-1/3}$$

Time to build models (3/4)

• flows

$$(\text{net flow in box 1}) = 1 - \alpha^* m_2 = 1 - (u_2 - u_1) m_2$$

$$(\text{net flow in box 2}) = \alpha^* m_1 - \delta^* m_2 = (u_2 - u_1) m_1 - (u_2)^{-1/3} m_2$$

• earning of agents

$$\int_0^T e^{-rt} p_t dt$$

where price p_t given by market equilibrium

$$\text{demand} = D(p)$$

$$(\text{for ex: } D(p) = 1/\sqrt{p})$$

$$\text{offer} = m_2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{price} \quad p = D^{-1}(m_2)$$

Time to build model (4/4)

RFG system

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial t} &= (1 - m_1(u_2 - u_1)) \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial m_1} + ((u_2 - u_1)m_1 - (u_2)^{-1/3} m_2) \frac{\partial u_1}{\partial m_2} - \frac{(u_2 - u_1)^2}{2} \\ \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial t} &= (1 - m_1(u_2 - u_1)) \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial m_1} + ((u_2 - u_1)m_1 - u_2^{-1/3} m_2) \frac{\partial u_2}{\partial m_2} - \frac{1}{2} (u_2)^{2/3} + D^{-1}(m_2) \end{aligned} \right.$$

If demand is stochastic, prices are stochastic.

For example demand = $D(p) + \varepsilon w$ w Brownian

then price $p = D^{-1}(m_2 - \varepsilon w)$

Value functions depends on (m_1, m_2, w)

$$\frac{\partial u_i}{\partial t} = [\dots \text{as previously}] + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 u_i}{\partial w^2}$$